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The International Atomic Energy Agency: An
Expanding Role in the Post-Chernobyl World
On October 26, 1956, the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency I was opened for signature for a period of ninety days
by "all States Members of the United Nations." 2 During the period,
eighty states, including the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, signed the Agreement which established the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 3 Among other functions,
the Agency was empowered to "take positive steps to encourage the
exchange among its members of information relating to the nature
and peaceful uses of atomic energy" and to "serve as an intermedi-
ary among its members for this purpose."'4 On April 26, 1986, ex-
actly six months short of the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency's
founding, explosions caused a fire in the fourth unit of the
Chernobyl nuclear power station, 130 kilometers north of Kiev in the
Ukraine, U.S.S.R. 5 For three days, the Soviet government remained
silent while radioactive clouds began to spread over neighboring
countries, and only slowly over the following weeks and months did
details of the near calamity emerge. Although the Soviet govern-
ment has since provided extensive data on the causes and effects of
the Chernobyl accident, it remains clear that the IAEA, for at least
that critical three day period, failed in one of its most important
functions.
This Article will attempt, through an examination of the current
legal status and structure of the IAEA, to account for the Agency's
seeming impotence in that critical situation. It will also outline the
several important services which the Agency currently provides and,
finally, will suggest an expanded role for the IAEA in a post-
Chernobyl world.
The concept of an international atomic energy organization op-
erating within the United Nations system was suggested by the U.N.
I Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency, openedfor signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter IAEA Agreement].
2 p. SZASZ, TIlE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
71 (Legal Series No. 7, 1970).
: IAEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV.
4 Id. art. VIII.
5 Response to Chernobyl, INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY Butl.., Summer 1986, at 62.
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Atomic Energy Commission as early as December 1946.6 A confer-
ence was subsequently organized to draft an agreement, and the text
of the statute was adopted unanimously by the conference members
on October 23, 1956. 7 Currently, there are over 100 signatories to
the original statute, including all the world's major atomic energy
users.
The structure of the Agency is similar to that of other U.N. off-
shoots. The IAEA Board of Governors is at the "heart" of the or-
ganization.8 This board makes most of the important decisions since
the General Conference convenes only once a year. 9 Membership
on this executive board is governed by a number of complicated cri-
teria set out in the statute. ° All Agency functions not specifically
delegated by the statute are undertaken by the Director General and
the IAEA staff, together comprising the Secretariat.iI Most of the
Agency's day-to-day activities are handled by this arm.
Article III of the IAEA Agreement sets forth the Agency's in-
tended functions. The Agency is mandated to serve as an intermedi-
ary for the exchange of scientific and technical information on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and as a promulgator of safety stan-
dards.' 2 The Agreement contains provisions for sending inspectors
into nations receiving IAEA advice or services, but only "after con-
6 p. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 71.
7 Id. The IAEA Agreement was entered into force in July of the following year. Id.
at 72.
Bernard Baruch, a U.S. statesman, was the first to envisage international control of
atomic energy. The Baruch Plan, presented to the U.N. in 1945, would have given the
Agency authority to own and operate all atomic plants and materials throughout the
world. D. Fischer, Lecture Given at the Training Course on the Legal Aspects of Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy (April 16-26, 1968), reprinted in NUCLEAR LAW FOR A DEVELOPING
WORLD 3 (Legal Series No. 5, 1969).
8 The General Conference is comprised of all member states, but its powers are
strictly circumscribed. IAEA Agreement, supra note i, art. V.
) D. Fischer, supra note 7, at 6.
10 IAEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. VI, §§ A-D.
P 1 . SZASZ, supra note 2, at 393.
12 More specifically, the Agency is authorized:
1. To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical ap-
plication of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world ... ;
2. To make provision ... for materials, services, equipment, and facili-
ties ... to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical
application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes;
3. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peace-
ful uses of atomic energy;
4. To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the
field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;
5. To establish and administer safeguards ... in the field of atomic energy;
6. To establish or adopt ... standards of safety for protection of health
and minimization of danger to life and property ... in the field of atomic
energy;
7. To acquire or establish any facilities, plants and equipment useful in car-
rying out its authorized functions, whenever the facilities ...in the area
concerned are inadequate ....
IAEA Agreement, supra note I, art. III.
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sultation" with the state involved.' 3 Soon after the Agency's found-
ing, one legal scholar commented on these powers: "These are truly
unprecedented inspection powers which apply regardless of the type
or extent of Agency assistance. Yet, these provisions resulted in rela-
tively little controversy during the International Conference. They
may, however, cause considerable difficulty when the time comes to apply
them. "14
This prediction has proven accurate. The IAEA, like most inter-
national organizations, has no independent enforcement powers.
Without authorization from member nations, the Agency has no
means for ensuring that its standards are met. 15 Over the years,
however, most nations have granted the Agency various powers
through agreement. Hundreds of such agreements are now regis-
tered at its offices. 16 Most of the agreements concluded by the IAEA
involve one of the following subject matters: Nuclear materials sup-
ply, project assistance, technical assistance, or the carrying out of
Agency safeguards.' 7 The last of these areas has grown to be the
most significant. Even in the safeguards area, however, a nation
must have some incentive to allow the IAEA to come in and super-
vise the handling of its nuclear materials. Paul Szasz, in his defini-
tive, albeit somewhat dated, study of Agency practice, has suggested
three reasons why nations agree to the implementation of safe-
guards: "(a) The desire to receive international assistance for nu-
clear energy programmes . . . (b) Participation in some bilateral,
regional or world-wide non-proliferation arrange-
ment . . . (c) Internal or external political pressures."' 8 An obliga-
tion to submit to Agency safeguards can also be established by
treaty. 19
The IAEA Agreement specifies six areas of safeguards proce-
dure: design review, records, reports, inspections, deposit of excess
produced material, and sanctions. 20 All nuclear facilities that use
safeguarded nuclear materials must undergo a design review. 2 '
Szasz has identified a two-fold purpose for these reviews: "to deter-
mine whether the facility will per se further any military purpose and
13 Id. art. XII.
14 Bechhoefer & Stein, Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic Energ, Agency, 55
MICH. L. REV. 747, 784 (1958) (emphasis added).
15 p. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 539.
16 For a list of agreements registered with the IAEA through the end of 1982, see
AGREEMENTS REGISTERED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 3-218 (Legal
Series No. 3, 9th ed. 1985).
17 p. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 894-97. "Safeguards" is a "term of art" within the
Agency, referring to IAEA standards aimed at ensuring that nuclear materials are used
only for peaceful purposes. IAEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII.
18 p. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 539-40.
1') Id.
20 IAEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § A.
21 p. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 597.
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whether it will permit the effective application of safeguards."' 22 In
addition, records must be kept on the operation of each safeguarded
facility. On the basis on these records, the state is required to submit
operating and accounting reports to the Agency. 23
Perhaps the most important aspect of the safeguards system is
the inspectorate which ensures compliance with Agency safeguards
at facilities operating under a project agreement. As stated by Szasz,
The credibility and the reliability of the entire safeguards system of
course rests on this device-for no matter what solemn undertakings
are made by a State and no matter how detailed are the reports sub-
mitted, the only assurance of compliance and correctness is that
which can be achieved by actual, on-the-spot checks.
24
The Agency is authorized to carry out initial inspections of safe-
guarded facilities, routine inspections of those facilities while they
remain under Agency control, and special inspections in unique cir-
cumstances. The activities of the Agency's inspectorate have grown
dramatically over the years. In 1985, over 1,980 inspections were
carried out in 514 nuclear installations in 51 non-nuclear-weapon
states and four nuclear-weapon states. 25 Perhaps even more signifi-
cant is that, for the first time, in August 1985 a safeguards inspection
took place in the Soviet Union.2 6
Although article XII, section A of the IAEA Agreement requires
the deposit with the Agency of any excess fissionable material pro-
duced under Agency safeguards, the provision has never been en-
forced.2 7 In addition, because inspectors rarely encounter non-
compliance with safeguards standards, 28 Agency sanctions are im-
posed infrequently.2 9 Despite these inadequacies, IAEA safeguards
activities are significant and certainly worthy of continuation.
In light of the obvious shortfalls of the current IAEA system un-
covered by the Chernobyl accident, however, more guidance must be
offered by the Agency. In the area of information access, no re-
sponse was required of the Soviets as a member of the IAEA.
Although in 1985 the Agency promulgated a set of guidelines for
22 Id.
23 Id. at 598.
In 1985, over 21,000 state reports were processed by the Agency. The IAEA data
base increased by some 15%, to approximately 4.3 million records. INT'L ATOM. ENERGY
AGENCY ANN. REP. FOR 1985 59.
24 P. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 599.
25 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY ANN. REP. FOR 1985 59.
26 Id. at 62.
27 P. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 600.
28 Id. at 603. As of 1970, no significant non-compliance had been discovered by an
inspector nor any sanctions imposed. Id.
29 Possible sanctions include: curtailment of Agency assistance to the offending state,
the ordered return of Agency materials and equipment, and the suspension of any non-
complying member from the exercise of its rights and privileges of membership. Id. at
602. See also IAEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § (A)(7).
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exchanging information in case of radiation release, 30 compliance
with these rules is merely voluntary. Compliance is mandatory only
for projects using Agency assistance pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the IAEA and that state.3 ' "Except in such instances ... the
Agency's safety standards only have the value of recommendations
issued by a qualified international body." 32
As a result of the Soviets' initial reluctance to disclose informa-
tion concerning the accident, two related events occurred. First, res-
idents of neighboring countries experienced a sort of "blind fear"
not knowing how or if their air, water, and food supplies might have
been affected. Second, and less predictably, the fears of people
around the world were unnecessarily aroused by inaccurate and in-
flammatory reports of the accident in the press, especially by press
coverage in the United States. "It was not hard to find examples of
questionable news judgment, particularly in the few days after the
April 28 revelation of the accident .... Newspapers and television
gave big play to an early UPI report of 2,000 deaths attributed to a
single unidentified resident of Kiev." '33 A swift, organized informa-
tion retrieval and dispersal network would have helped to ameliorate
30 Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Information Exchange
in a Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials, IAEA INFCIRC/321 (1985). The
U.S.S.R. was among the 19 member states sending representatives to the guideline meet-
ings. Id. at III.
The Guidelines, an eight page document, are far too vague in defining a "reportable
event," essentially leaving the designation to the regulatory authorities of the member
states. Id. at 3. In addition, the Guidelines lack sufficient detail in their description of the
information that must be exchanged. Specifically, they recommend that the following in-
formation be made generally available in advance:
Characteristics of the facility . . . ; Relevant regulations, plans and proce-
dures on environmental protection and radiation protection in case of an
emergency; Site-development characteristics influencing the dispersion of ra-
dioactive releases; Technical information on monitoring equipment, sam-
pling techniques, interpretation of measurements and other issues which
may affect the assessment of the situation . .. ; Demographic and other rele-
vant information for the Emergency Planning Zones.
The Guidelines go on to recommend that the following information be made available after
the event:
Identification of the facility involved; The nature of the accident, the time at
which it occurred and its possible development; The characteristics of the
release; Information on meteorological and hydrological conditions, neces-
sary for forecasting the dispersion and dilution of the release; Off-site protec-
tive measures taken or recommended; Results of environmental monitoring;
Information on the development and termination of the emergency
response.
Id. at 5-6.
See also Guidelines for Mutual Emergency Assistance Arrangements in Connection
with a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA INFCIRC/310 (1984).
31 EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS IN NUCLEAR LAW 4 (IAEA Legal Series No. 8, 1972).
'32 Id.
33 McGrath, Did the Media Hype Chernobyl?, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1986, at 31.
The "irrepressible" New York Post claimed, "Mass Grave: 15,000 Reported Buried in
Nuke Disposal Site." N.Y. Post, May 1, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
both these problems. 34
The real irony of the Chernobyl incident is that the Soviets
might have agreed to mandatory information guidelines without the
prompting of a major accident. This likelihood is evidenced by their
recent growing participation and interest in IAEA activities. The So-
viets consistently supported the passage of the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted October 26,
1979. 3 5 In 1977, a Soviet representative recommended that the
Convention "should cover all operations involving nuclear material,
including its use, storage and transportation, and also the protection
of nuclear facilities." '3 6 In addition, on June 10, 1985, a safeguards
agreement, which resulted from a voluntary offer by the Soviet
Union to place some of its peaceful nuclear installations under
Agency safeguards, entered into force. 37
It is crucial that neither the U.S.S.R. nor other nations be al-
lowed to forget the lessons of the Chernobyl accident. Instead, the
accident must be used as a springboard to reformation and expan-
sion of the IAEA. In this area, some progress has already been
made. At a special session of the IAEA Board of Governors on May
21, 1986, the Board reached a consensus on the establishment of two
international agreements. "The first one would commit its parties to
provide early notification and comprehensive information about nu-
clear accidents with possible transboundary effects. The other would
commit its parties to co-ordinate emergency response and assistance
in the event of a nuclear accident which could involve transboundary
radiological release." 38 In addition, at a meeting of fifty-six IAEA
member states in Vienna in August 1986, a consensus emerged on
early notification of nuclear accidents-involving either civilian nu-
clear power plants, military production reactors or nuclear-propul-
34 The Soviets have since released a report on the accident. This report was dis-
cussed by Soviet experts and scientists from around the world in an IAEA special meeting
in Vienna from August 25-29, 1986. As reported by SCIENCE magazine:
There is also general agreement, both among delegates to the meeting and
radiation experts in the United States, that the report provides an impressive
amount of information on radiation exposures to Soviet citizens. Although
there are inevitable gaps in the information, the radiation data are "better
than we had a right to expect," says Warren Sinclair, president of the U.S.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NRCP).
The Aftermath of Chernobyl, SCIENCE, Sept. 12, 1986, at 1141.
35 CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL Foreward (IAEA Legal
Series No. 12, 1982).
"36 Id. at 320 (Statement by the Representative of the U.S.S.R.).
37 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY ANN. REP. FOR 1985 60. See also supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
3'8 Response to Chernobyl, INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL., Summer 1986, at 61.
The Board also decided to convene a post-accident review meeting to include a wide
range of experts, to convene a post-accident working group to consider other measures to
improve co-operation in the nuclear safety field, and to convene a conference of govern-
ment representatives to consider a wide range of nuclear safety issues. Id.
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sion units aboard warships and submarines. 39 Both the United
States and Soviet Union joined in this consensus. 40 This agreement
and the Board proposals must now be brought to fruition.
Conclusion
Ideally, the IAEA will undergo two major reforms in the wake of
Chernobyl. First, a mandatory agreement patterned on the current
IAEA information exchange guidelines (but in much greater de-
tail), 41 must be promulgated by the Agency, and all member nations
should be encouraged to sign. Second, the Agency must enforce al-
ready existing IAEA Agreement provisions for health and safety in-
spections.42 "The Statute leaves no doubt that compliance with the
applicable health and safety measures is to be controlled by the
Agency by the use of inspectors. 43 After about four inspections per-
formed in the early 1960's, however, "none have been carried out
since."'44 An activation of this inspectorate division, though it will
require a substantial increase in the Agency's budget, 45 will help as-
sure that the damage caused by any future "Chernobyls" is held to a
minimum. Another option is to expand the number and role of the
Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs), organized in 1983
"with a view to assisting regulatory authorities in their review of op-
erating nuclear power plants . . . 'by providing an international
frame of reference .... "-46 As aptly put in a leading newspaper
editorial, "[i]t will be a long time before people everywhere stop di-
viding the history of nuclear power into two periods-pre-Chernobyl
and post-Chernobyl. That allows some hope that the nations of the
world will close ranks against a threat that recognizes no borders or
ideological distinctions. ' 47
STUART F. CLAYTON, JR.
39 L.A. Times, Aug. 15, 1986, § 2, at 4, col. 1.
40 Id.
41 See supra note 2, at 600.
42 IAEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § B.
43 P. SzAsz, supra note 2, at 693.
44 Id. at 696.
In March 1985 a new IAEA arm, the Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, met for the first
time. The Group's function is to provide a forum for the exchange of information in the
field of nuclear safety, but it will carry out no regulatory activities. INT'L ATOM. ENERGY
AGENCY BULL., Summer 1985, at 52.
45 The proposed IAEA 1986 budget provided $33.6 million in funds for safeguards
activities, $18.6 million for general administration but only $16.7 million for nuclear en-
ergy and safety. INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL., Autumn 1985, at 61.
46 Id. at 63.
47 L.A. Times, May 1I, 1986, § 5, at 4, col. i.
1987)

